International migration in western Europe by Nijkamp, P. & Spiess, K.
Wh ïl 
ET aculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie 
05348 
Serie Research Memoranda 
International Migration in Western Europe: Macro Trends 
in the Past, the Present and the Future 
P. Nij kamp 
K. Spiess 
Research Memorandum 1993-72 
December 1993 
vrije Universiteit amsterdam 

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE: MACRO TRENDS 
IN THE PAST, THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE 
Peter Nijkamp Katharina Spiess 
Department of Regional Economics 
Free University 
Economics Faculty 
De Boelelaan 1105 
1081 HV Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
\ 
ABSTRACT 
One main topic in the (political) discussion in Western Europe is related to the 
increasing irnmigration flows into Western Europe. Western Europe seems to 
enter an irnmigration century. 
This paper tends to offer in its first part facts on global trends in West European 
international migration in the past and present time. In mapping out the patterns 
of European migration, first a brief description of the different types of 
international migration flows since the Second World War is given. Next to this 
the present composition of the foreign population in six selected countries of the 
European Community is described and it is explored wether specific patterns 
could be observed. Third some more country-specific information is presented. 
In the second section of the paper the attention is focused on possible future 
trends in international migration flows within, into and out of the Western 
European countries. The approach which is chosen for the analysis start with a 
short look at dominant background trends in fields affecting international 
migration in Western Europe. One group of discussed fields refer to the macro-
level, notably fields like population, economy, political situation, migration 
policies, transport, communication and environment. As a last field we focus on 
developments in social networks, as a field, which could be allocated on the 
meso level of analysis. 
Despite of the existence of various more or less plausible indicative global trends 
in the various fields we focus on some more specific scenarios for the above 
mentioned fields. Based on the scenarios in a second step the question on their 
impacts on international migration in Western Europe is answered. This analysis 
is mainly guided by a ceteris paribus analysis, that is: the impacts are explored 
mainly without taking the developments in other fields into accout. The last 
section ends with a summation of the most probable trends in international 
migration. It seems most probable that the majority of developments lead to a 
positive effect on international migration into Western Europe, that means an 
increasing irnmigration. Only trends in the field of migration policies seems to be 
able to lead to a decrease in irnmigration. However, these effects only have 
limited effects. 

1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most discussed topics nowadays in European politics, in econo-
mics and in various scientific research areas is international migration in relation 
to the development of Western Europe. According to some authors it seems as 
though Western Europe is at present entering the age of migration [1]. 
For Europe the issue of international migration has two - often discussed -
mam dimensions. On the one hand, Europe is facing the so-called "doublé ageing 
process". Since the mid sixties a period of substained low fertility rates in Europe 
can be observed, while at the same time an increasing life expectancy is 
experienced. This process of dejuvenation and ageing may in the future lead to 
labour shortages and may seriously strain the social security systems [2]. 
On the other hand the lifting of the Iron Curtain which has for a long time 
precluded an intensive exchange of people and goods between the Western and 
Eastern part of Europe has suddenly made the prospect of substantial migration 
flows from the economies in transition to the West a reality and cause for 
concern [2]. The year 1989 was a landmark in East-West migration. A total of 
1.3 million people from the Eastern part of Europe left for the West during that 
year [3] and many more foliowed in subsequent years. 
Any discussion of European migration however, makes it necessary to dis-
tinguish between migration movements inside the EC (European Community) or 
- in a broader context - the EEA (European Economie Area including both EC-
and EFTA-countries) and migration from third countries into the EC or EEA 
Migration inside the EC has historically been characterized by long term 
(structural) movements from less developed to more prosperous regions. The 
scale of internal migration in the Community forms a remarkable contrasts with 
that in the U.S., where the propensity to move is very high. While legal barriers 
to migration in the Community have already largely been removed, linguistic and 
cultural barriers remain apparently significant. The completion of the internal 
European market may provide a mrther stimulus to inernational migration, but 
is unlikely to give rise to sudden migratory flows [2]. 
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Migration between the Community and third countries tends to be an 
asymmetrie process. There has been a tendency for flows in one direction to 
persistently exceed those in the other. This has as a net result let to a small but 
relatively continuous net inflow from third countries during the 1970s and the 
1980s. This steady inflow, averaging some 100-300 thousand people a year, 
increased the EC population born outside the Community to a total of around 8 
million by 1988, or 2,5 % of the total population excluding non registered 
immigrants [3]. 
A main question in Europe is of course: what will be the future trends? 
First of all it should be noted that it is impossible to predict with sufficiënt 
reliability how migration will affect the population of the Community over the 
next decade. However, the use of different scenarios may help to map out which 
possible future trends may infhience international migration and to which extent. 
The goal of this paper has to be seen voor this perspective. 
In the first section we describe facts on global trends in European 
(international) migration in the past and present time. lm mapping out the 
pattems of European migration, first a brief description of the different types of 
international migration flows since the Second World War is given. Next, the 
present composition of the foreign population in six selected countries of the 
European Community is described, while it is explored whether specifïc pattems 
can be observed. Thirdly, some more country-specifïc information will be 
presented. 
In the second part of the paper the attention is focussed on possible future 
trends in international migration flows within, into and out of the Western 
European countries. The purpose is to discuss different scenarios on 
international migration. These scenarios are designed in the framework of 
different developments in fields affecting international migration in Western 
Europe. Based on various of possible trends in these fields, we will subsequently 
investigate their impacts on international migration pattems in Western Europe. 
Finally, we will produce a mosaic of developments in different areas affecting 
intra-European migration. 
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We stress the fact that we focus only on scenarios and not on forecasts. 
Scenarios are to be interpreted here as unconditional projections, which indicate 
only what will happen if certain conditions are fullfilled [4]. 
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2. GLOBAL TRENDS IN THE PAST AND PRESENT TIME 
A glance at Europe's migration history in the past two centuries shows that by 
and large Europe may be characterized as an emigration continent. Before the 
Second World War Europe did not even absorb foreigners, but on the contrary it 
were predominantly the Europeans who were absorbed mainly by the three big 
immigration countries, the United States of America, Canada and Australia [5]. 
Talking about Europe - and especialiy Western Europe - as an immigration 
continent was certainly not possible before the Second World War. And even in 
the post-war period not all Western European countries have been immigration 
countries for this whole period, as is shown by Table 1 for the period 1960 -
1988. 
Table t about here 
For the year 1990, a comparison between various selected European 
countries, viz EC - and EFTA-countries with the exception of Luxembourg [6], 
shows that only Ireland and to some degree also Spain - both having a negative 
net migration - may nowadays be characterized as emigration countries. 
Table 2 about here 
For the EC as a whole, figures presented by Muus and Cruijsen [7, Table 1] 
indicate that the EC has experienced a net inmigration of about 6,420,000 
persons in the period 1960-1989, which equals an average net in migration of 
214,000 persons annually. During the period 1985-89 an average annual net 
inflow of almost 500,000 persons could be recorded for the European 
Community. 
The observed net inflows for the EC since 1960 do not show - as Table 3 
illustrates - a smooth predictable linear pattern, but follow a more or less 
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cyclical path. Changing circumstances have led to different migration flows. 
Table 3 about here 
For the EC as a whole a sharp increase in net migration can again be 
observed since 1987, which however in 1989 had not yet reached the peak of 
nearly 1,000,000 immigrants into the EC which took place in the year 1962. 
Muus and Cruijsen [7] have pointed out the backgrounds of the different 
migration flows in terms of different types of migrants and different nationalities. 
In mapping out the patterns of European migration in more detail hereafter, 
we will first briefly describe the different types of international migration flows 
since the Second World War [5,6,7,8,9]. Next we will describe the present 
composition of foreign population in six selected countries of the European 
Community and explore whether it is possible to identify specific patterns [8]. 
Finally, we will add some more country-specific information, like for example the 
distribution of various types of migration over selected European countries [6]. 
In light of these tasks an important issue for any detailed, comparative 
analysis (and projection) of international migration should be mentioned in 
advance, viz. the need for internationaUy consistent data on international 
migration in Europe. Up to now the availability of international comparable 
information is even for the West European countries rather poor. Already very 
simple but crucial statistical indicators like annual net migration or the total 
annual number of immigrants and emigrants distinguished by nationals, EC-
nationals and non-EC-nationals are - as pointed out in a study of Poulain [10] -
not standardized and sometimes completely lacking. France, for example, is 
known for its absence of migration statistics. For an overview of the available 
data on international migration in the West European countries - their 
classification and available time series - we refer to Van Imhoff et al. [11]. These 
difficulties in comparing data should therefore be kept in mind in the subsequent 
part of this paper. 
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We now start our discussion of different immigration flows in Europe. 
A first type of immigration flow into Europe, which can be positioned at 
different time periods since 1950, is linked to the postwar decolonization process. 
Besides the return of European colonists and colonial officers, countries like 
Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, which were 
colonial nations in the past, recorded sizeable immigration flows by migrant 
workers from their former overseas territories.1 
A second type of immigration flow played a major role in the 1950s until the 
mid 1970s, when a number of countries - notably Switzerland, France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Benelux countries and Sweden - started to 
meet part of their growing demand for labour by recruiting labour force from 
several Mediterranean countries. In the initial period of hiring these guest-
workers, Italy was the most important recmitment area, while in the 1960s Spain 
and Portugal became the most important recmitment and emigration countries. 
In the 1970s, Turkey, Marocco and Tunesia became increasingly more important 
countries of origin. In the early 1970s, the employment of foreign labour reached 
its maximum level in the post-war period. In 1970, West-Germany was leading 
with nearly 2,1 million foreign workers. 
After the oil price shock and the economie recession in the mid 1970s the 
recmitment of foreign labour appeared to decline sharply and more restrictive 
immigration regulations were imposed. In view of the reduced absorption 
capacity of the labour market, the aim was to stop further immigratipn. But as 
Table 1 indicates these policies had only a short term effect. This is especially 
trae for Germany, where the average annual net migration flows of foreigners 
decreased from 297,040 in the time period of 1970-74 to -32,370 in the period of 
1975-79 [9, Table 3]. The long-term effect however shows no reduction in 
immigration flows: after 1985 almost all Western European countries experi-
enced a recovery of their annual migration inflows of foreigners. 
For example, during the period 1954 - 1962 more than one million former French residents 
of Algeria resettled in France [8]. 
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Despite the formal cessation of labour migration it is however much more 
important to mention that this cessation has now led to a rise in migration for 
family reunification. This third type of European post-war migration, namely 
family migration, particularly family reunification, is one of the major migration 
flows in the recent past and in the present time. The male workers reunified 
with their wives and children in the settlement countries. In the mean time a 
new phenomenon in this context has emerged, viz. family formation migration, 
that means a marriage with a foreign partner.2 This different type of chain 
migration is not surprising taking into account that immigrant children (i.e., the 
second generation) are growing up and might prefer to marry a partner who is 
still living in the country of origin. 
Furthermore one side-effect of the increasing restrictive immigration regula-
tions since the mid 1970s in West European countries should be added, viz. the 
rising number of illegal immigrants into Westera Europe.3 
Since the 1980s a new pattern of labour migration developed. Besides the 
North-West European countries also most Southern European countries, 
particularly Italy, have become countries of immigration. It is noteworthy that, 
much of the "official" labour migration within and into Europe at present is "high 
level manpower and to a lesser extent, with high level manual skills" [6, p.14], 
With growing political conflicts, ei vil wars and economie crises in the Middle-
East, South America and Africa in the recent past - in addition to the above 
mentioned increasing flows of foreign labour and family migration -, the flow of 
asylum seekers into Western Europe is drastically increasing since the 1980s, as 
Table 4 indicates for the whole of the EC since 1987. 
Table 4 about here 
In a number of European countries this family migration is the biggest single component of 
gross inflows, except from asylum seekers (for instance, in 1988 90 percent into Belgium and West-
Germany, and 70 percent into France) [6]. 
3
 Böhning estimates the number of illegal immigrants in Western Europe about two million 
plus 500.000 persons refused asylum [6], 
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When we look at the period 1985 - 1989, an annual average of almost 165,000 
asylum seekers can be estimated [7]. In 1990 Western Europe received 539,000 
applications for asylum in 1991 [6]. As a special case the emigration flows in 
1991/1992 out of the former Yugoslavia - as a result of the war between Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzogovina - should be mentioned, as they are the largest single 
wave of emigration since 1946/47 [6]. 
The above described types of migration can in general be characterized as 
south-north migration streams. East-west migration within, in and out of Europe 
has on the other hand by far not played such an important role in the post-war 
European migration history as south-north migration. East-west migration was 
greatly reduced for 40 years due to the political division of Europe. Mass 
migration mainly occurred in cases of political crisis.4 With the end of the 
socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe however, east-west migration 
flows have recently been intensified. Particularly the large flows of people with a 
German origin out of Poland, the former Soviet-Union, Hungary and Rumania 
should be mentioned in this context.5 These ethnic immigrants can finally be 
mentioned as an additional dominating migration stream into EC member states 
at the present time. 
Besides these two main directions of European postwar migration (south-
north, east-west migration), Fassmann and Münz [8] mention a third main 
pattern of European migration: the migration between hinterlands and home 
countries. This means that European migration clearly shows distinct privileged 
relations between parts of countries. A further specification of this statement can 
be found in an analysis of the percentages of the foreign resident population in 
six major receiving countries of Western Europe. 
Table 5 about here 
4
 For example, the emigration flows out of Hungary as a result of the revolution of 1956. 
5
 In 1989, Germany counted 377,000 ethnic Germans, the so-called "Aussiedier" [6]. 
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As Table 5 indicates, almost all Algerians, Tunesians, Portuguese and 
Maroccans in these six countries hve in France. The vast majority of migrants 
from East-Central Europe are to be found in Germany, while in addition, some 
72 percent of all ex-Yugoslavs and 74 percent of Turks reside in Germany. Nine 
of the ten Greeks living in the six major receiving countries also reside in 
Germany. Most Finnish emigrants moved to Sweden, while most Austrian 
migrants emigrated to Germany. For the United Kingdom, it may be pointed out 
that it absorbs almost all Irish (outside Ireland), and almost all Indians, Paki-
stanis and Bangladeshis living in Europe.6 Migrants from Italy and Spain follow 
a less specific pattern. ItaHans outside Italy, who are registered in the six major 
receiving countries are mainly spread over Germany (37.8 percent), Switzerland 
(26.7 percent) and France (17.5 percent). The majority of Spanish foreigners can 
be found in France (44.4 percent), Germany or Switzerland. 
For the whole European Community, it appears that from the total of 13.4 
million foreigners in the EC in 1989 49 percent were citizens of non-European 
countries, 38 percent citizens of other EC states, while only 13 percent were 
citizens from other European countries. Among the non-European countries the 
Turkish people are with 31 percent of all Non-European citizens in Europe by 
f ar the largest group, while all Africans represent 35.4 percent. Migrants from 
Asia and South and North America together represent 32.3 percent of the 
foreign citizens of non-European countries [6]. 
Finally we will touch upon the question whether special types of migrants can 
be associated with special countries. Even though we mentioned already briefly 
this question above, an explicit look at the gross flows of migrants into Western 
Europe by types of immigration (labour migrants, ethnic migrants and asylum 
seekers) in Table 2 shows that ethnic migrants are only to be found in Germany. 
In the SOPEMI-report [12], in addition, ethnic Greeks and ethnic Turks coming 
6
 This information is not included in the above mentioned Table 5; it refers to Colemann [6, 
Table 2a]. 
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from Eastern Europe are mentioned in this context. For the ethnic Germans it is 
noteworthy, that during the period 1986-1900 a total number of more than 
1,000,000 "Aussiedier" has been recorded. For the period of January-July 1991 
about 20,000 "Aussiedier" arrived monthly [7]. For the group of the asylum 
seekers, it is noteworthy that Germany - foliowed by France - seems to be the 
most attractive country for them. The majority of labour migrants also seems to 
prefer Germany as the most attractive country of destination. Austria appears to 
be positioned on the second place in terms of absolute numbers of labour 
migrants. These high (absolute) numbers of all types of migrant inflows to 
Germany is parallelled by the fact that this country has in absolute numbers the 
largest foreign population, even without taking the ethnic Germans into account. 
As Table 2, shows Germany with 649.5 thousand inflow of foreign population is 
on the top of the selected countries in terms of absolute numbers of immigrants. 
A look at the most recent past - the period since 1980 - shows that this is true 
for this whole time period. This means, that we are not talMng about a year-
specific effect, but about a structural pattern. In a relative sense however, by 
taking the foreign population as a percentage of the total population, Switzer-
land is with 16.5 percent foreign population the European country with the 
highest percentage of foreigners among its population [6]. 
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3. FUTURE TRENDS: A FIELD-SPECIFIC SCENARIO APPROACH 
3.1 Introduction 
Having presented past and present trends in international migration 
(particularly in Western Europe), we will in tbis section focus our attention on 
possible future trends in international migration flows within, into and out of the 
Western European countries. 
International migration is in general one of the most unpredictable demo-
graphic phenomena. As a result of this uncertainty in prediction, there is a 
variety of attempts at forecasting international migration flows, orginating from 
different disciplines [7, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Differences in flows in international 
migration are related to different developments of the global human system 
migration belongs to and in which migration takes place. Besides these macro 
level developments, international migration is also influenced by meso (group or 
regional) factors7. 
In our approach to the present discussion on possible future trends in 
international migration in Western Europe, we will first take a short look at 
dominant background trends in fields affecting international migration in 
Western Europe. Table 6 summarizes the various fields whose developments are 
likely infhiencing international migration in Western Europe. 
Table 6 about hmt 
Despite the existence of various more a less plausible indicative trends in the 
various fields, it does not make much sense to concentrate on only one specific 
trend in each of these fields. Therefore, we aim to focus on different scenarios 
for the above mentioned fields. We will mainly base our approach on global 
When we do not consider trends or factors at the micro level, this does not mean that we are 
not aware of the importance of these factors in international migration. The micro level of analysis 
however, is such a different one, that it would need an additional separate analysis. 
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scenarios, while we will now and then stress specific aspects, which are 
interesting in the context concerned. Given the complexity of factors in different 
fields affecting international migration in Western Europe, we recognize that our 
contribution is by far not exhaustive. 
After a short discussion of possible future trends in the above mentioned 
fields, we will focus in a second step on the main purpose of this paper: given 
different "field scenarios", we will investigate their impacts on international 
migration in Western Europe. The analysis of these impacts is mainly guided by 
a "ceteris paribus" analysis, that is: we explore these impacts mainly without 
taking the developments in other fields into account. This kind of analysis is 
chosen in order to be able to use different "if-then" statements, which would 
have been difficult to analyze by taking the entire complexity of international 
migration into account. 
A distinction in our analysis - at least in most cases - is made between 
international migration related to developments in Western Europe and such 
ones referring to the so-called third countries - sometimes further subdivided 
into Eastern and Central Europe and developing countries. The latter 
subdivision refers to the fairly probabüistic assumption that from these two parts 
of the world the most significant immigration pressure into Western Europe is to 
be expected. 
Our analysis will be embedded in the theoretical framework of a systems 
approach or refers at least to one important characterisitic of this .theoretical 
approach, namely the recognition that to capture the changing trends and 
patterns of international migration requires a dynamic - instead of a static -
perspective [17]. This dynamics however, also covers the f act that international 
migration is not only influenced by changes in the overall system but also that 
the overall system (more specifically, global trends at the macro- and meso-level) 
is influenced by international migration flows. In our analysis we will limit 
ourselves mainly to the first effects. 
2,2 The Macro Level 
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3.2.1 Population 
(1) Western Europe 
The most important demographic trend in recent years in most West 
European countries is - as already mentioned in the introduction - a decline in 
fertüity [18, Fignre 3.1]. At the present time only Ireland has a total fertility rate 
higher than 2.1, a level which would be necessary for a replacement of 
population [19]. Also in the future, West European countries (again with the 
exception of Ireland) are likely to experience a fall in population referring to the 
natural population "growth". On the other hand, life expectancy in the West 
European countries is increasing [18]. 
The most fundamental impact of these trends which are expected to con-
tinue8 is the progressive ageing of the population. It is estimated that in 
Western Europe the population of persons over 65 years will increase from 13 
per cent in 1985 to more than 20 percent in 2020 with an increasing tendency 
beyond that year. This ageing population will impose severe socio-economic 
strains, in particular on social welfare systems [18, 2]. 
One scenario, which Masser et al [18] characterize as the most probable one, 
would be that the crises of the social security system are overcome by a 
continued growth in productivity. In terms of the impacts on international 
migration, this would lead to no further need for international migration [18]. 
A second scenario would be an immigration financed social security system, 
which may result in a positive effect on international immigration into Western 
Europe [18]. However, policies which try to solve the problems of the social 
security system by immigration must be aware of the fact, that - as recent 
empirical studies show - immigrant minorities tend to conform in a generation or 
so to the fertility patterns of the majority, non-migrant sector of the countries in 
8
 About the extent to which these trends will continue however, there exist a variety of 
assumptions. The Commission of the European Communities, for instance, takes for granted that 
until the year 2000 natural population growth will fall to zero and after the year 2000 population 
will begin to decline [2]. 
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which they settle [5]. 
(2) Third countries 
Looking at population trends of third countries, we first have to remark that 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe - apart from Poland and Yugoslavia -
have a population structure similar to Western (particularly North-Western) 
Europe [2]. In light of this fact no significant immigration pressure out of 
Central and Eastern Europe can be expected from the viewpoint of potential 
demographic differences. 
The expectations for the population in developing countries are a 
continuation of their rapidly growing population. Recent and projected growth 
fits - as Appleyard [20, Table 1] shows - almost perfectly the classical exponential 
form. Under certain assumptions of fertüity and mortality for the less developed 
regions of the world, an increase of the population from 4 billion in 1990 to 6 
billion in 2014 is projected. Looking at these trends (and without taking the 
developments of other factors - like e.g., the success of modernization of the 
economies in developing countries - into account), it is obvious that a severe 
immigration pressure out of these countries9 will emerge from the viewpoint of 
expected demographic differences [20]. 
But even when it seems evident that with the growth in world population an 
immense worldwide migration potential also towards Western Europe is given, it 
is not self-evident that this potential will actually result in international migration 
[13], as demographic differences as an explanation for migration are very much 
connected with economie differences. Therefore, especially in the context of the 
"population field" we will refer to scenarios of the "economy field". 
322 Economy 
9
 Talking about developing countries in our context niainly refers to African (like Marocco, the 
Maghreb, Egypt, the Near East, Turkey) and Asian countries (like Pakistan, Bangladesh, India), 
because - as Section 2 shows - they are the main hinterlands of international migration from 
developing countries into Western Europe. 
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(1) Western Europe 
With the completion of the internal EC market and alliances with EFTA 
countries, Western Europe presents an economie empire of unprecedented 
magnitude. The single European Market will require firms to expand beyond 
their traditional markets [18]. 
One scenario for future trends in West European economies - addressed by 
Masser et al. [18] as the most likely one - is that - despite the growing 
internaHsation and integration of the national economies in Europe - there will 
remain large disparities within Western Europe. The already existing gap 
between affluent countries, like Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg and France 
which produce more than twice as much GDP per capita than Ireland, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, will increase or at least remain stable. If income 
disparities between the European core and periphery will increase, this may lead 
to a positive effect10 on future international migration within the European 
Community (or concerning Europe of the twelve as a whole: internal migration 
might increase due to regional differences; see [21]). Hofrmann-Nowotny [13] 
even claims that the intra-European migration potential depends exclusively on 
differences in economie development. If large developmental disparities within 
Europe are persistent over a longer period, than a continuing intra-West-
European migration is plausible. 
A second scenario described by Masser et al. [18] is one, which assumes in 
respect to regional economie developments decentralization programmes11. 
Such a scenario might be related to success in the Community's regional policies, 
aimed a more balanced distribution of economie activity in the EC as a whole 
[2]. For the migration flows within the EC this scenario indicates no additional 
migration caused by regional income disparities. 
Another aspect of the economie development of Western Europe pointed out 
If we talk about a positive effect on international migration from now on, we mean 
increasing future migration into Western Europe or within Western Europe. 
Such as the Technopolis Network, the Remote Area, Highway Programme etc. [18]. 
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by Muus and Cruijsen [7] is the question, whether the existing labour force in 
Western Europe is sufficiënt in quantitative and qualitative respect to fulfil the 
short and long term needs of the European market and the national labour 
markets. One very extreme scenario in this context could be that no additional 
labour force is needed and therefore no pull effect is to be expected. 
Another extreme scenario, which refers to the decreasing natural population 
growth, might be that the existing labour force is not sufficiënt and will thus 
attract new immigration flows from third countries. This possibility of future 
labour shortages might be due to the decrease in natural population growth [2]. 
Besides these very extreme scenarios it may be more realistic to distinguish 
between the type of labour expected to be needed in the future European 
market. Most probably, the future European market will need qualified pro-
fessionals and experts from outside Western Europe. For unskilled workers most 
likely no significant demand will occur [15]. Consequently, a pull effect is 
expected for skilled workers, which may indeed lead to an increase in skilied 
labour, or as Straubhaar and Zimmermann [15] express it: an immigration by 
(labour) market rules most probably leads to an increase in business migrants. 
(2) Third countries 
Looking at the economy of Central and East European countries and their 
way to become market economies, the number of scenarios that may be 
developed for such a process is - as van de Kaa [16] remarks - virtually 
unlimited. It is even possible that periods of stagnation or depression will 
emerge. Van de Kaa distinguishes three different time periods of future 
economie developments of these countries. In the short term, which most 
probably will cover a period of 1-4 years, a disruption of the existing system will 
cause severe unemployment, a reduction in the Standard of living and 
considerable poverty. In the medium term (most probably covered by a period of 
3-6 years), economie output will increase, what will run parallel to an 
improvement in living standards and an increasing demand for labour. In the 
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long run (assumed to start after 5 years) significant improvements in the 
economie situation are expected and also likely. Economically motivated 
migration from East and Central Europe will occur - according to the scenarios -
most likely in the short run and to a lesser degree in the medium run. Also the 
Commission of the European Communities [2] notices that further migratory 
pressures are likely to originate from Central and Eastern European counties, as 
well as from the newly independent states of the former USSR, depending on 
their success in achieving a transition to a market economy. However it is clear 
that not all countries will go through such a sequence at the same speed and 
neither will they begin at the same time. Therefore, irnmigration from Central 
and East Europe is supposed to show significant differences in the flows out of 
the various countries. Most probably the migration flows out of the former 
USSR will be relatively higher than the ones for example out of Hungary, with a 
much more stable economie situation. 
Besides these economically induced migration flows out of East and Central 
Europe, it should be added that with the ongoing changes of these countries in 
the direction of market economies also an important - but nevertheless small in 
number - stream from Western Europe to these countries might be observed in 
the near future. More precisely, a temporary irnmigration of entrepreneurs and 
experts into this countries is not unlikely [16]. 
Given the economie situation of the developing countries characterized by 
high and increasing rates of unemployment and underemployment, typically weak 
resource bases, low productivity, high external debt, and difficulty of access for 
their exports to world markets, it is plausible that depressingly low rates of 
economie growth are to be observed. A scenario, which at least in the long run 
may lead to an economie improvement in these countries, may be linked to four 
aspects of a development package, which Appleyard [20] characterize as a 
necessarity to create an appropriate environment of economie growth, namely 
trade, debt relief, investment and effective aid. Such a rather unlikely scenario 
may lead to a slow stop of the increase of the gap between the economie differ-
ences between South and North. For international migration this might mean at 
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least no further increase in South-North migration12. Such a development could 
even lead to an emigration out of Western Europe, for instance, in terms of 
temporary migration relating to skill transfers. 
Another - more probable - scenario is: increasing economie differences 
between the developing and developed countries of Western Europe. This will 
have ceteris paribus a very strong positive effect on irnmigration out of the 
developing countries into Western Europe [16]. However, it should be realized 
that the population in countries suffering from severe poverty is generally more 
likely to stay there than the population of countries in relatively better economie 
circumstances, with a higher per capita GNP. Therefore, the first mentioned 
group of people mean no migration "threat" to countries of Western Europe 
because of the inability to finance travel and the lack of knowledge on where to 
find the opportunities [20]. 
An additional relevant aspect, was mentioned by van de Kaa [16], who claims 
that it is very likely that some of the funds traditionally spent by Western 
European countries in the Third World are likely to be diverted towards aid in 
view of the economie refonns necessary in Eastem Europe and the former 
USSR. For the Third World countries this leads to an even worse economie 
situation. 
Referring to the push factors of international migration this might intensify 
irnmigration pressure into Western Europe. Van de Kaa [16] also points out that 
increased possibilities of attracting migrants from Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR caused by economie differences might have the effect of reducing 
the interests in workers from the Third World and might make their position on 
the labour market even more difficult. This might then lead to a declining 
tendency of emigration out of the developing countries. 
3.2.3 Political Situation 
For further proposals at how to avoid the economically motivated irnmigration pressure out 
of the developing countries, we refer here to Straubhaar and Zimmermann [15, p.27]. 
20 
states. 
Finally we refer here to Penninx and Muus [14], who remark that there are 
always situations from which people want to escape and that new ones are 
always arising. If no other opportunities are available for a refugee elsewhere -
for instance as a migrant worker -, the number of people claiming refugee status 
and asylum will grow. Penninx and Muus [14] conclude that therefore migration 
pressure into Western Europe will continue to be high in the future. 
3.2.4 Migration Policies 
In this subsection trends in the field of immigration policies will be analyzed 
in more detail. This issue is extremely important, in view of the present dis-
cussion about international migration in Western Europe. On the other hand, 
also migration theory stresses the importance of regulations for international 
migration [22, 23]. 
(1) Western Europe 
Until now each European state has its own immigration policy which lead to 
a variety of regulations starting with very liberal regulations like for example, in 
Germany and ending up with more restrictive ones like in the case of Switzer-
land.13 
First, we want to focus here on West-European immigration policies 
concerning international migration from outside Western Europe into Western 
Europe. Reports that asylum is frequently sought on tenuous grounds and on 
increasing numbers of illegals or undocumented residents, are helping to make 
international migration one of the central problems in the present political 
discussion. Those migrants who are jobless and are supported by grants through 
welfare benefits are the subject of envy and resentment specificaUy by the lower 
For a synoptical comparison of the immigration policies in France, Germany, Italy, and the 
Netherlands see [24] and for a comparison between Germany, Belgiiun, France, Great Britain, and 
the Netherlands see [25]. 
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(1) Western Europe 
Most West-European countries may be characterized as stable democratie 
systems for a longer period. It is probable that they will remain stable demo-
cratie systems, even when various internal problems may affect in different 
degrees their political systems. For international migration within Western 
Europe differences in the political situations will most likely not play an 
important role. Rather it might be the case that these stable democratie systems 
will - like already in the past - attract politically motivated migrants trom outside 
Western Europe. 
(2) Third countries 
Major political disturbances in third countries however are - as the develop-
ment in the former USSR or also in some African states show - much more 
probable than in Western Europe. For Central and Eastern Europe on their way 
to become liberal democracies characterized by basic human freedom, it is 
especially the development in the former USSR which seems at the present time 
- with the exception of the former Yugoslavia - most unstable. 
As one scenario in the context of this subsection we mention here a situation 
of further stabilization in the Central and Eastem European countries, which will 
lead to a reduction in emigration pressure out of these countries caused by 
political motives. 
Another scenario might be political destabilization, a step back in the times 
of less political freedom or further bitter interethnic conflicts [12] and as a 
consequence a positive effect on immigration into the West-European 
democracies. 
For the developing countries we can mainly transfer the above roughly drawn 
scenarios. A scenario of major political disturbances like political upheavals and 
internal conflicts occurring in African and Asian countries might lead to major 
flows of refugees and asylum seekers into Western Europe. Looking at the 
present internal conflicts especially in some African states, this scenario seems to 
be more probable than the one of a globally stable political situation in these 
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class nationals. Such resentments make fertile ground for extremist parties [16]. 
Continued immigration will give rise to an "underclass" in society, if the incoming 
numbers are so large that they cannot be absorbed. These internal tensions have 
led to a discussion about more restrictive immigration regulations in all West-
European countries. 
At the European level, with the current unification process of Europe, there 
are already first steps in the direction of a cooperation in more restrictive 
regulations. Besides the Dublin Agreement and the Maastricht Treaty, in this 
context the Schengen Agreement (1990) signed by Germany, France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg might be mentioned as an example. The main 
purpose of this agreement is a global abolition of migration controls at the 
common (internal) borders as well as a free circulation of citizens of countries 
which are a party in the agreement. Concerning international migration the 
competence of migration authorities at the supranational level will increase. In 
this context, it is of special importance that a comprehensive Schengen 
information system will be developed in order to be able to control the external 
borders effectively. The introduction of a uniform visa is also laid down in the 
Schengen Agreement. Each request for asylum submitted by an alien on the 
territory of one of the parties is considered by others. However, each party will 
test the request for asylum according to national laws. The Schengen Agreement 
also deals with sanctions against travel companies bringing in aliens from third 
countries who do not have the necessary travel documents [26]. 
According to these developments, it seems realistic to design a most probable 
scenario, which leads to further restrictive immigration regulations [13]. This 
assumption is underlined by the declaration of governments of all Western 
European countries on various occasions that they are not immigration countries 
[13]. Remembering the scenario of subsection 3.2.2 about the economie situation, 
it is most probable that these more restrictive immigration regulations 
particularly intend to decrease the flows of unskilled workers from third coun-
tries. It is most likely that West-European countries will grant work permits to 
persons who have sküls of immediate relevance to society in fairly exceptional 
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cases [16]. More restrictive entry policies in general however, wül most probably 
be accompanied by policies aimed at dealing more quickly and effectively with 
requests for asylum and with a practise of deporting without delay those whose 
request have been denied [16]. In such restrictive trends, for the majority of 
migrant flows a negative effect is to be expected. 
Very important in the context of a scenario of increasing restrictive immigra-
tion policies is an expected increase in illegal migration caused by the fact that 
the existence of "ülegals" is a function of the system of immigration control. 
Much however, will depend on stricter border controls against all forms of illegal 
immigration [13] and the extent to which and the way in which bringing in or 
aiding illegal migrants wül be punishable [16]. 
A scenario of a non (or less) restrictive admission policy at the end of 
individual nation states in all (or apart of the) European states is less probable. 
Taking the above described internal trends into account, such a scenario would 
only have a higher chance of becoming reality, if groups for an "open Europe" 
and non-government organizations - like, for example, councils of churches or 
international aid organizations - will receive significant more attention and get a 
stronger position in the international and national political arenas [13, 16]. 
In a second step we will now focus attention on immigration policies in 
respect to international migration within Western Europe. As already mentioned 
in the context of the Schengen Agreement, the trends in international migration 
within Western Europe can mainly be characterized by an opposite picture, 
namely increasing freedom to migrate within the West European states. The 
European Single Act specifies that the circulation of EC nationals should be 
completely free within the borders of the European Community since January 
lst, 1993. In addition to such institutional processes which will influence intra-EC 
migration, there are also agreements under way which are being negotiated 
between the EC countries on the one side and the EFTA countries on the other. 
Switzerland, for example, has indicated that some compromise regarding privi-
leged entrance of nationals of the EC and the other EFTA countries should be 
possible [13]. The question however, is which effects the disappearance of the 
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controls on the common borders will have on international migration within 
Western Europe. 
One scenario which seems at first sight rather plausible is that with the 
freedom to move within Western Europe international migration within this 
region will increase. Penninx and Muus [14] expect that the migration of entre-
preneurs and company-linked migrant workers - particularly of more highly 
specialized employees - will increase once the legal and practical impediments, 
which in the past often formed a barrier, have disappeared within an integrated 
EC. 
As a special aspect it might be added that "sun-belt" migration of pensioners 
and persons with private income within the "twelve" could also certainly increase 
in scale, if legal and practical restrictions would be removed within the EC [14]. 
Another scenario however, many according to historical experiences become 
more likely: no further increase in migration within Western Europe due to an 
increasing freedom to move within Western Europe. Seeking for lessons from 
the past an interesting example may be mentioned here. In analyzing population 
movements within the European Community for the period 1968-1972 Böhning 
[27] shows that the effect of the introduction of free movement of labour on 
international migration was not very significant. Rather the extent of observed 
exchanges was primarily linked to demand and to the economie climate. 
"Regulations for freedom of movements of labour do not seem to provide 
'enough freedom' to cause strong migratory movements based exchisively on 
push-factors, while they do provide sufficiënt 'freedom' to allow pull factors to 
work at times of economie growth and increasing strains on the labour market, 
or at least on parts of it" [14, p.376]. 
As an additional specific case the special admission policy of Germany 
towards ethnic Germans living mostly in the Central and Eastern Europe might 
be mentioned. Further immigration into the Community of large numbers of the 
estimated 3 million or so people of German descendance living in the East can 
be expected in the future [2]. 
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(2) Third countries 
Assuming that Western Europe's future is mainly affected by immigration 
from outside, it is important to look at policies in third countries and their 
impacts on migration, with a particular view on emigration restrictions in the 
countries of origin, particularly Eastem and Central Europe and the developing 
countries. 
In general, it may be noticed that most countries from which people would 
like to emigrate do not restrict exit, in contrast - as illustrated above - to coun-
tries to which people would like to go.14 
In the case of Eastern or Central Europe, the present time is - and perhaps 
also the future seems to be - different. The former USSR exemplifies a situation 
to prevent emigration at a larger scale by making the costs involved to be 
entitled to be issued a passport three to four times as high as a Standard monthly 
wage. The freedom in principle to move is therefore losing appeal. As a very 
probable scenario, van de Kaa [16] addresses especially in the case of the USSR 
a trend of a continuing restrictive emigration policy: "assuming that the [pre-
dicted] unemployed would include proportionally large numbers of new entrants 
on the labour market it is difficult to believe that the USSR would led them go" 
[16, p.97]. Such an scenario obviously would lead to a negative effect or at least 
to no further increase on international immigration into Western Europe. 
A more unlikely scenario of a more liberal emigration policy in this special 
case might lead to an increase or at least status quo of international migration 
into Western Europe. 
Hoffmann-Nowotny [13] stresses one more important aspect, namely that the 
former Soviet satellites will in the medium run apply for full membership of the 
EC. If full membership were granted unconditionally, Hoffmann-Nowotny draws 
the scenario of East West migration streams at least comparable in size to those 
from Europe's South to the North in the sixties. 
Zollberg [23] even comes to the conclusion that it is finally the policy of the potential 
receivers who determine whether a movement can take place and of what kind. 
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In respect to the developing countries we only want to add the note that it is 
very unlikely that they will go towards a more restrictive emigration policy. In 
this respect no limitations on potential immigration flows into (Western) Europe 
can be expected. 
Before changing our level of analysis to the meso level, we will look at trends 
in two more fields, notably transport and communication, and environment. 
32.5 Transport and Communication 
Personal mobility in terms of total distance travelled has more than doubled 
in Western Europe between 1960 and 1990. The expected substitution of physical 
travel by the introduction of computer networks however has not yet material-
ized. It seems much more that the latest developments in Communications also 
lead to an increase of the demand for face-to-face contacts [18]. 
Even when this trends at a first sight may not affect international migration, 
the migration literature [28] tells us that travel contacts are of importance for 
international migration, for instance, given the fact that travellers communicate 
information about potential countries of destination or that travellers can be 
characterized as bridgeheads for further migration streams. Therefore an 
increase in travelling might indirectly result in a positive effect on international 
migration into Western Europe. 
In a broader context of transport and communication, a general trend in the 
past towards cheaper15 and faster transport and communication can be 
observed. These developments, accompanied by the design of a trans-European 
infrastructure network [2], might have a positive effect on the migration of 
entrepreneurs and people employed by international companies. In terms of 
numbers however, these migration streams are not significant. 
If we talk about cheaper transport and communication, we refer mainly to cheaper mass 
transport and communication. 
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A continuation of the above mentioned trends - parallel to the 
internationalisation - could also have a negative effect on international migration 
within Europe. The reason for this can be found in the fact that faster and 
cheaper transport and communication16 does not make it necessary annymore 
to migrate; it will increasingly be the case that the action space of entrepreneurs 
and businessmen is growing. 
Faster and less expensive communication and transport to and from 
developing countries may induce a higher irnmigration, indirectly also caused by 
the fact that infonnation about Western Europe is reaching potential migrants in 
developing countries. 
3.2.6 Environment 
In general, background trends in environment tend to play a minor role in 
analyzing international migration. Environmental, trends are seldom mentioned 
in the context of analyzing the future of international migration. Nevertheless, 
we may mention here one scenario pointed out by Straubhaar and Zimmermann 
[15]. According to the authors, ecological refugees will become more and more 
important in the future. Due to some ecological damages in Eastern Europe 
(like e.g., Tshernobyl), some people will lose their natural base of survival what 
urges them to leave their actual place of living. 
An other scenario refers to a further destruction of the environment in 
developing countries relating in particular to the changes induced by unusually 
fast climatic changes including global warming [29]. This could lead to a positive 
effect on international migration out of these countries [16]. 
A scenario of an improving the environmental situation in the developing 
world could at least take away the irnmigration pressure caused by environ-
mental destruction. 
It should be mentioned that especially in the field of telecommunication, new developments 
in infonnation technology offer many benefits in terms of the spatial integration of the Community 
[2]-
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But it is obvious that especially these background trends and their impacts on 
migration cannot be significant without taking other - in the context of interna-
tional migration - much more important background trends into account. 
As a conclusion of this subsection we want to summarize the trends, which we 
have characterized as the most probable ones, and their impacts on international 
migration in the following Table 7. 
Table 7 about here 
3.3 The Meso Level 
3.3.1 Social Networks 
Besides macro-trends, international migration streams are, as international 
migration theory - particularly approaches related to the systems approach [17] -
and empirical studies17 point out, strongly influenced by social networks. The 
importance of such networks has already been pointed out in Section 2 of this 
paper, referring to the fact that family migration is one of the main migration 
streams in the most recent past and the present time. 
(1) Western Ewope 
The impact of social networks on international migration within Western 
Europe means in most cases migration which is - with some time delay - accom-
panied by movements of families. The development of social networks however, 
will to a large extent depend on migration flows caused by other reasons, like 
e.g. economically-motivated migration. If in the cause of future unification of 
The role of social networks in the international migration process, e.g., from Turkey to 
Sweden or from Portuguese migrants to France is illustrated and analyzed by Engelbrektsson [30] 
and Boisvert [31], respectively. 
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Western Europe - as assumed in one of the above scenarios - the migration of 
entrepreneurs and that of company-linked migrants will increase, than this will 
most probably, be accompanied by movements of families [14]. 
(2) Third Countries 
In the context of Central and Eastern Europe, the assessment of the direction 
and size of immigration streams as a result of social networks between Western 
and Central respectively Eastern Europe requires a look at national communities 
of Eastern and Central European countries in Western Europe. Sizeable 
communities of Czech-Slovaks exist in Germany, France, Austria and 
Switzerland. In Western Europe sizeable Hungarian communities now also exist 
in Germany and France, while also most other countries count a few thousand 
Hungarians amongst their population. Other PoHsh communities of several 
thousands exist in France, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. Almost all 
European countries report increasing numbers of Rumanians seeking political 
asylum. These trends may in due course lead to an exodus, due to family 
reunMcation of considerable size in comparison to lts total population. The 
recent flows of people from Eastern Europe are likely to be a source for further 
immigration for the purpose of family reunification [16]. Nevertheless, Van de 
Kaa stress the fact that East Europeans are relatively to other non-EC migrants 
still small in number and that therefore for the time being the phenomenon of 
family reunification will not generate significantly higher migration streams. 
In contrast to the relatively small number of East Europeans, the number of 
Yugoslavs and Turks is relatively high [16]. The tendency of their existing 
communities in Western Europe towards chain migration might be dependent of 
a variety of factors. Especially for the case of France, Hoffmann-Nowotny [13] 
remarks that an increase in immigration consisting mainly of North African and 
Turkish immigrants is expected due to family migration. For the case of the 
Netherlands e.g., he predicts the contrary: a decrease in family migration, 
because of (1) an increasing group of potential marriage candidates of the same 
ethnic group in the Netherlands and (2) because of the fact that an increasing 
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number of Turks (and Maroccans) who are bom in the Netherlands will marry 
Dutch partners. 
Also in relation to the developing countries, the existing pattems of migration 
form an indication for future inflows. These pattems suggest a continuing 
pressure from the Maghreb countries of North Africa (particularly from Tunisia, 
Marocco and Algeria). These pressures are expected to be directed towards 
France, and to a lesser extent, Belgium and the Netherlands [2]. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
The presentation of past and present trends in international migration gives 
us a first possible future trends in international migration. By analyzing different 
more or less plausible developments in various fields affecting international 
migration however, pohcy relevant information on what may be expected on 
future European migration flows may be generated. 
At the end of our discussion of European migration issues the question may 
be asked: What do the scenarios reveal? A few fmdings need to be highlighted. 
On the basis of an 'aggregation' of the most likely major trends and their 
impacts on international migration within, into and out of Western Europe, the 
majority of "pluses" in the last three colurns of Table 7 lead us to the conclusion 
that in general the developments in most relevant fields distinguished may cause 
an increasing immigration into Western Euorpe (i.e., a pull phenomenon). It 
appears that only trends in migration policies, seem to have a "negative effect" 
- as a push effect - on immigration into Western Europe. However, the effect of 
more restrictive immigration policies should - as history teaches us - not be 
overestimated. It is therefore no surprise that all Western European countries 
expect further immigration, despite restrictive immigration policies and 
discouraging measures and despite the fact that by now none of them views itself 
as an immigration country in the stricter sense of the word. 
Based on trends towards more restrictive immigration policies however, a 
trend towards more illegal migrants, which are increasingly replacing "regular 
work" migration is most likely to be observed. 
For former socialist European countries there are clear indications that they 
will increasingly become emigration countries, and that migrants from these 
countries will be in competition with migrants from developing countries. From 
developing countries the flows of asylum seekers will most likely increase. 
Even though we did not give any quantification of future trends, it should be 
mentioned that compared to the migration potential from the outside, the intra-
EC migration potential is modest and will hardly increase fast. It seems also 
plausible that among the Western European countries. Germany will most likely 
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be the most important and attractive immigration country. For Germany, the net 
effect of international immigration into Europe is - as Börsch-Supan [32] shows -
not necessarily negative. In his analysis migration is shown to alleviate the 
burden of dependency by shifting these strains to years with lower dependency 
ratios. In general, we may assume that the future of international migration in 
Western Europe will be selective immigration for which a refined admission and 
selection system will undoubtedly be developed. 
It is obvious that there are various other - notably national - aspects, which 
should be taken into account talking about scenarios of Western European 
migration. In general, a country speciflc analysis (see for example, Hoffmann-
Nowowtny [13]) would be needed, even though it is a difïïcult task to offer a 
quantification of country-specific future migration flows (see e.g., [16]). another 
uncertain factory which should not be overlooked is the issue of return migration 
or even emigration pressure into Eastern Europe. 
After having described a "most likely scenario", we wish to conclude here with 
an interesting proposal, pointed out by Straubhaar and Zimmermann [15]. They 
offer the suggestion to create an extemal EC immigration policy, that aims for a 
General Agreement on Migration policy. Within such an international 
framework - according to the authors - the efficiency of a worldwide reallocation 
of labour is more likely to be reached than in a situation with national labour 
markets. 
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Xabl* 1 Average annual aigration flows to and fro« selected 
European countires, 1960-1988 
Period 
1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1988 
Immigrants 
Belgium 69,056 65,583 64,688 58,271 47,862 48,584 
Germany, 
Fed. Rep. 
576,211 706,144 873,051 527,483 502,179 554,230 
Netheriands 57,746 71,009 89,140 97,571 79,419 88,481 
Sweden 29,226 45,404 43,342 41,368 . 32,212 41,593 
United King-
dom 
- - - 186,600 186,400 227,500 
Emigrante 
Belgium 35,271 41,503 47,615 52,990 58,663 54,949 
Germany, 
Fed. Rep. 
364,108 508,695 566.839 521,131 499,138 411,128 
Netheriands 51,218 60,329 61.179 59,737 61,962 54,434 
Sweden 15,226 19,842 35.697 23,897 27,396 22,166 
United King-
dom 
- - - 207,600 214,000 208,500 
Net Migration 
Belgium 33,785 24.080 17.073 5,281 -10,801 -6,365 
Germany, 
Fed. Rep. 
212,104 197,449 306.211 6,352 3,040 143,102 
Netheriands 6,528 10.679 27.961 37,833 17,457 34,047 
Sweden 14,000 25,562 7.644 17,472 4,816 19,427 
United King-
dom 
- - - -21,000 -27,600 19,000 
Data for the Federal republic of Germany cover onry 1961-1987. Those for Belgium refer to 1960 and 1963-1987. Fbr 
the United Kingdom, the period covered is 1975-1988. 
Source: Zlotnik and Hovy (1990, Table 1) 
Table 2 Recent gross inflow» of migrants into selected European 
countries, 1990, by type (thousands) 
Country 
of desti-
nation 
Labour 
migrants 
Ethnic 
migrants 
HU 
All 
foreign 
(exdud-
ing asy-
lum 
seekers, 
indudes 
some 
EC) 
Hf
 f
 II 
Total 
popula-
tion 
Gross 
immi-
gration 
per 1,000 
(indudes 
asylum 
seekers) 
Net 
migra-
tion per 
1,000 
Austria 103.4 22.8 123.1 145.9 7,660 19.0 16.1 
Belgium 3.7 13.0 52.3 65.3 9,948 6.6 1.1 
Denmark 5.3 40.7 46.0 5,135 9.0 1.7 
Francs 26.2 54.7 63.1 117.8 56,304 2.1 0.9 
Germany 138.6 397.1 193.1 649.5 1239.7 62,679 19.8 15.9 
Greece 4.1 10,057 2.9 
Ireland 3,506 -2.6 
Italy 4.7 57,576 2.4 
Nether-
lands 
21.2 60.1 81.3 14,893 5.5 3.3 
Norway 4.0 11.7 15.7 4,233 3.7 0.4 
Portugal 0.1 10,337 0.9 
Spain 8.6 33.9 42.5 38,925 1.1 -0.2 
Sweden 29.4 23.9 53.3 8,527 6.3 4.1 
Switzer-
land 
46.7 35.8 1014 137.2 6,674 20.6 8.5 
United 
Kingdom 
34.6 30.0 52.4 82.4 57,323 1.4 0.9 
Total 353.2 397.1 426.8 121Z1 2027.1 353,778 5.7 
Notes: 
Blanks indicata that data are not available. Data on labour migrants to EC countries do not usually indude dtizsns 
of other EC countries 
Austria: 'All foreign' figure is an estimate of net migration. 
France: all foreign exdudes some EC. Belgium: labour data 1989. Germany all foreign 1989. 
Germany: data refer to the area of the Federal Repubiic before re-unification. The total of ethnic migrants refers only 
to 'Aussiedier" from Eastem Europe and the USSR, not from the former East-Germany, of whom there were 238,282 
from January 1990 to June 1990. 
All foreign figure is for 1989. Total inflow' for 1990 indudes that figure (Meyer 1992) 
Spain: 'All foreign' total is for 1989. 
Switzeriand: exdudes seasonal workers. 
Net migration indudes persons of all citizenship. Foreign immigrants exdudes asylum seekers. 
Source: Coleman (1993, Table 1) 
Xabla 3 Mat aigration for tha Europaan Coaaunity (in thousands) 
Source: Muus and Cruijsen (1991, Table 1) 
Tabla 4 Asylua seekers in tbe Buropaan Conaunity (in tbousands) 
Source: Muus and Cruijsen (1991, Table 4) 
Table 5 Foreign resident population in six major receiving 
countries of Western Europe: Percentage distribution of 
foreign residents by country of origin within the total 
foreign population of that origin residing in six 
receiving countries, and total foreign resident 
population by country of origin and country of residence 
(1990) 
Country of residence Six-country total 
Country 
of origin 
Belgium France West 
Germany 
Nether-
lands 
Sweden Swttzar-
land 
Percent FRP 
(1,0008) 
Austria * * 85.2 * 1.3 13.5 100.0 213 
Finland * * 7.9 * 92.1 * 100.0 130 
Greece 5.9 * 88.6 1.4 1.8 2.3 100.0 355 
ttaly 16.6 17.5 37.8 1.2 0.3 26.7 100.0 1,452 
Portugal 2.0 76.8 10.1 1.0 * 10.2 100.0 841 
Spain 9.7 44.4 27.6 3.5 0.6 23.9 100.0 539 
Turkey 3.8 8.9 74.3 9.0 1.1 2.8 100.0 2,255 
Yugo-
slavia 
0.6 5.7 72.1 1
-5 4.5 15.5 100.0 905 
Algeria 1.7 97.3 1.1 * * * 100.0 637 
Morocco 14.9 61.5 7.1 16.5 * * 100.0 951 
East-
Central 
Europe 
* 11.0 81.0 • 5.7 2.3 100.0 421 
Tunesia 2.6 85.6 10.7 1.1 * * 100.0 242 
United 
States 
28.7 * • 27.9 19.6 23.8 100.0 41 
Others 10.2 25.8 39.6 8.5 8.2 8.5 100.0 3,050 
Total 
(percent) 
6.9 30.2 43.8 5.8 4.0 • 9.3 100.0 
Total 
(l,000s) 
905 3,608 5,242 692 484 1,100 12,030 
Note: Asterix indicates no data are available. 
Sources from Fassmann and Münz: OECD/SOPEMI (1992, severai tables) 
Source: Fassmann and Münz (1992, Table 3) 
Tabla 6 Different macro and meso fields influencing interna-
tional migration in Western Europe 
Macro level Meao level 
• population • social network» 
• economy 
• political aituation 
• migration policies 
• transport/communication 
• environment 
Table 7 Host likely •ajor trenck and their iapacts on international •igration within, 
into and out of Western Europe 
Field Regional 
Divïsion 
Trends Iapacts on 
Iaaig-
ration 
into 
Ue-
stern 
Europe 
Eaig-
ration 
out of 
Ue-
stern 
Euorpe 
«igr-
ation 
within 
Ue-
stern 
Europe 
Population • Western 
Europe 
• Developing 
countries 
• Ageing population: growth 
financed social security. 
• Further rapidly growing 
population. 
0 
• 
Economy • Western 
Europe 
• Central 
and Eastem 
Europe 
• Developing 
countries 
• Increasing or at least 
stable gap betueen effluent 
regions and nonaffluent 
regions. 
• Increased deaand in ski lied 
labour and no further deaand 
in unskilled labour. 
• Disruption of the existing 
systea wiII cause (in the 
short run) severe uneaploy-
nent and reduction in the 
Standard of living. 
• On their way to aarket 
economies: deaand for 
entrepreneurs and experts. 
• Increasing econoaic 
differences between devel-
oping countries and the 
developed countries of 
Western Europe. 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Politica! 
Situation 
• Third 
countries 
• Politica! upheavals and 
internal conflicts will 
continue. 
+ 
Migration 
Policies 
• Western 
Europe 
• (Former) 
UdSSR 
• More restrictive imai-
gration policies for aigrants 
f rot» out si de Europe with the 
exception of ski lied labour. 
• Increasing freedoa to aove 
within Western Europe. 
• (Indirect) aore restrictive 
eaigration policies to avoid 
a big exodus. 
-,*
4 
0 
Trans-
port/Coaau-
nication 
• uorlduide Faster and in a way cheaper 
transport and coamunication. 
+ 0 
Envi ronaent • Developing 
countries 
• Eastern 
Europe 
• Further destruction of the 
envi ronaent. 
• Further ecological daaages. 
+ 
1
 "+": increas ing immigration; "-": deereasing inuiigration; "0": 
no e f f e c t on migration. 
2
 Effect on s k i l i e d labour. 
3
 Ef fect on uhsk i l l ed labour. 
* Ef fect on i l l e g a l migration. 
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